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Sin, Stigma & Society: A Critique of Morality
and Values In Democratic Law and Policy
I.
Oh who is that young sinner
with the handcuffs on his wrists?
And what has he been after
that they groan and shake their fists?
And wherefore is he wearing
such a conscience-stricken air?
Oh they're taking him to prison
for the colour of his hair.'
A. Morality, what crimes shall be committed in thy name?
H.L.A. Hart
In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a
decision for the first time on what was then one of the major open consti-
tutional issues facing contemporary American society. Stimulated by
Supreme Court opinions expanding the protection of privacy rights
under the Constitution, legal scholars had been debating the issue for
decades. Coupled with increased public attention, heightened by advo-
cates armed with data from the social and hard sciences, expectations
arose concerning the possibility of a major shift in long-established law.
After avoiding the issue for years, the Court finally spoke.
In Bowers v. Hardwick,2 the speculation and anticipation were ad-
dressed in an opinion which was denounced by civil libertarians as an
aberration and an abomination.' In 1982, an Atlanta policeman had dis-
1. Housman, Oh who is that young sinner with the handcuffs on his wrists?, reprinted in THE
PENGUIN BOOK oF HOMOSEXUAL VERSE, at 240 (1983) (A.E. Housman (1859-1936) was the fore-
most Latin scholar of his generation, a widely respected poet and a gay man).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
3. Commentators have been virtually unanimous in their criticism of Hardwick's reading of the
Court's privacy jurisprudence. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-21, at
1422-35 (2d ed. 1988); Conde, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215
(1987); Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick- Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648
(1987); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 210-20 (1986). Signifi-
cantly, retired Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, who admits to having cast the deciding vote
in the 5-4 decision in Hardwick, is recently quoted at a New York University School of Law forum
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covered Michael Hardwick in his bedroom, in bed-with another man.
Hardwick was arrested and charged with the statutory crime of "sod-
omy." 4 His arrest, under an otherwise unenforced statute, was the first
in some fifty years in the state of Georgia.5 Even though he and his
partner were both consenting adults acting in the privacy of his home,
the Court rejected out of hand Hardwick's challenge to the Georgia stat-
ute stating that "the Federal Constitution [does not] confer a fundamen-
tal right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy...." 6
Nearly six decades of privacy precedents which the Court had labo-
riously fashioned, from Meyer v. Nebraska 7 and Skinner v. Oklahoma8 to
Griswold v. Connecticut9 and Roe v. Wade 10 were summarily disposed of
on October 18, 1990 as stating that, "I think I made a mistake in that one ... I do think it was
inconsistent in a general way with Roe .... When I had the opportunity to reread the opinions a few
months later, I thought the dissent had the better of the arguments." See The National Law Journal,
Nov. 5, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
4. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another ...
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less
than one nor more than 20 years .... Id.
The content of sodomy statutes vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, many containing language
so broad as to defy precise understanding of what exactly is being prohibited. See, ag., Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972) ("Every person who shall be convicted of the detestable and abominable
crime against nature, committed with mankind or with beast, shall be punished by imprisonment in
the penitentiary for a term of not more than ten years").
Most sodomy statutes prohibit oral-genital and some anal-genital contact, although some state
courts have construed their statutes not to apply to oral acts. See, eg., State v. Potts, 75 Ariz. 211,
213, 245 P.2d 1023, 1024 (1953) (holding that oral- genital contact is not an "infamous crime against
nature"). However, states with sodomy statutes construed not to apply to oral sex generally also
have statutes proscribing "lewd and lascivious acts" or "sexual misconduct" that include oral-genital
contact. See, eg., State v. Pickett, 121 Ariz. 142, 146, 589 P.2d 16, 20 (1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1412 (Supp. 1988).
Because many of the statutes do have language prohibiting "unnatural and lascivious acts" or
"crimes against nature," rather than naming the specific acts themselves, judicial construction often
determines what acts are specifically prohibited. Yet, despite sodomy statutes' use of such open-
ended terms, courts have almost uniformly upheld the statutes against vagueness challenges. See
Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (per curiam) (upholding TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1980),
which prohibits "crimes against nature"); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (per curiam)
(upholding FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1987), which prohibits "the abominable and detestable crime
against nature"). But see Balthazar v. Superior Court, 573 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding Massa-
chusetts statute prohibiting "unnatural and lascivious acts" unconstitutionally vague as applied to
acts of fellatio and oral-anal contact).
5. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 (Powell, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 190. See also id. at 191.
7. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (one has a right to educate one's own children as one wishes).
8. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate is "one of the basic civil rights of man").
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy is a "penumbra" or "emanation" of various provisions
of the Bill of Rights).
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in two paragraphs as having no relation whatsoever to Hardwick's right
to privacy since, as the Court reasoned, those cases involved rights to
"family, marriage, or procreation."" This crabbed rationale was se-
verely criticized by the dissenting Justices, who pointed out that Hard-
wick's case,
is no more about a "fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy"
... than Stanley v. Georgia was about a fundamental right to watch obscene
movies, or Katz v. United States was about a fundamental right to place
interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about 'the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men'
namely, 'the right to be let alone.' 2
The only justification which the Court could put forward for al-
lowing the State of Georgia to intrude upon Hardwick's privacy was that
the state's legislature had concluded that acts of oral and anal sex of-
fended the morals of the majority of the people in Georgia. For the
Court, this was sufficient since "[p]roscriptions against that conduct have
ancient roots."' 3 By acquiescing in majority sentiment, the Court legiti-
mized the moral value system of the majority against the right of individ-
uals to choose how to conduct their private lives. The impetus for this
legitimization was made clear by Chief Justice Burger in his concurring
opinion. Citing "millennia of moral teaching," the Chief Justice charac-
terized sodomy "as an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, an heinous
act 'the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature.... , 14
This harsh rhetoric was the basis upon which the dissent insisted
that "the length of time a majority has held its convictions or the pas-
sions with which it defends them [cannot] withdraw legislation from this
Court's scrutiny."'" Moreover, "the mere knowledge that other individu-
als do not adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable
interest ... let alone an interest that can justify invading the houses,
hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to live differently."' 6 It follows
that "before Georgia can prosecute its citizens for making choices about
the most intimate aspects of their lives, it must do more than assert that
the choice they have made is an 'abominable crime not fit to be named
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy is implicit in the concept of "liberty").
11. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
12. Id. at 199, 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, I., dissenting) (citations omitted)).
13. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192.
14. Id. at 197 (quoting 4 W. BLAcKsroNE COMMENTARIES 215).
15. Id. at 210 (Blackmun, 3., dissenting).




The majority's opinion is not based on principled grounds. Preju-
dice, rather than sound legal argument, seems to be the basis for the
result in Hardwick. This fact is highlighted given what the dissenting
Justices called the majority's "almost obsessive focus on homosexual ac-
tivity." ' The Court repeatedly drew the issue as an alleged "fundamen-
tal right to engage in homosexual sodomy,"19 even though Georgia's
statute criminalized all oral and anal sex, whether homosexual or
heterosexual.
Unwittingly, the Hardwick majority left themselves open to the ac-
cusation of "distort[ing]" the case.2" Whether or not this distortion was a
conscious effort or not, the motivation may be inferred from a subsequent
sodomy case which the Court refused to review. In Post v. State,21 the
Court denied a grant of certiorari even though a state appellate court,
prior to Hardwick, had overturned a heterosexual sodomy conviction on
the ground that the federal Constitution guaranteed a right of privacy
"to matters of sexual gratification," at least with respect to heterosexu-
als.22 Clearly, the Court is not so much concerned with the actions of
persons, but with their status.
The central concern for the majority in Hardwick was not standards
of morality and their enforcement, but disapproval of, and revulsion to-
ward, gay people. Richard D. Mohr, Associate Professor of Philosophy
at the University of Illinois-Urbana, commented on this aspect of the
Court's decision:
[Tihe Supreme Court, by upholding Georgia's unenforced sodomy
law, allowed the state to use law as an invective against gays.
[It] reached its conclusion... without addressing, entertaining, or con-
sidering any gay issues. It reached its conclusion that the state may bar
gays from having any sex life at all without even discussing gays, or pri-
vacy, or sex. Concerns of gays simply did not merit any attention from the
Court.... In one sentence-with no analysis-it dismissed past privacy
precedents as irrelevant and in one more sentence-again with no analy-
sis-it assimilated gay sex to incest, child molestation, and drug use. The
Court, in its rush to let the state insult gays, could not be bothered with
17. Id. at 199 (quoting Herring v. State, 119 Ga. 709, 721, 46 S.E. 876, 882 (1904)).
18. Id. at 200.
19. Id. at 190-91.
20. Id. at 200.
21. 715 P.2d 1105 (Old. Cr. 1986), rehg denied, 717 P.2d 1151 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
290 (1986).
22. Post, 715 P.2d at 1109. See also 717 P.2d at 1152.
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argumentation and ideas.23
B. Sodomy Legislation in the United States of America
Until 1966, all fifty states had sodomy laws such as Georgia's. To-
day, despite the efforts of the gay rights movement to obtain reforms,
24
twenty-four states and the District of Columbia still have such laws on
the books.21 Seven states specifically prohibit same-sex sexual activity,
26
with the remaining applying equally to heterosexuals as to homosexuals.
At least one state distinguishes between married and unmarried
persons.27
Although rarely enforced against gay men and lesbians, 28 the poten-
23. R.D. MOHR, GAYS/JuSTICE, A STUDY OF ETHics, SOCIETY, Am LAW 315-16 (1988).
24. See generally J. D'EMILIo, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNrrED STATES 1940-70 (1983) (documenting the history of the
gay and lesbian legal rights movement).
25. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a) (3) (1982); AR1z. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411 to 13-1412
(Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-122 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981); FLA. STAT.
§ 800.02 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3505 (Supp. 1987); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1987); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 750.158, 750.338, 750.338(b) (1979); MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1988); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.090 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101, 45-5-505
(1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 886 (199'); LI. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01(1), 21.06 (Vernon 1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1988). Massachusetts also
has a sodomy statute criminalizing anal sex. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 34 (1986) (prohibiting
"the abominable and detestable crime against nature"), but the statute was arguably invalidated as
applied to private consensual conduct by Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 302, 318
N.E.2d 478, 481 (1974), which found a companion statute criminalizing "unnatural and lascivious
act(s)" unconstitutional as applied to private, consensual adult behavior.
26. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-122 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (Supp. 1987); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.090(3) (1986);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190(2) (1987); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1987). Sodomy statutes in other states may prohibit only same-sex sodomy
due to judicial invalidation of the statutes as applied to opposite-sex, but not to same-sex sodomy.
See, eg., Post v. State supra notes 21 and 22.
27. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60 (1982).
28. See RD. MOHR, supra note 23, at 52-53. However, these statutes are frequently invoked to
justify other types of discrimination against lesbians and gay men on the ground that they are pre-
sumed to violate these statutes. See, eg., Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073,
1075-76 (5th Cir. 1976) (invoking state sodomy statute and newspaper's right to choose not to be
involved in criminal activity to justify newspaper's refusal to print advertisement for gay counseling
and legal aid), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-
10489, 151 Ariz. 335, 340, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Ct. App. 1986) (invoking sodomy statute as pertinent
to finding bisexual man "nonacceptable to adopt children").
Discrimination occurs despite the fact that not all gay men and lesbians engage in sodomy, by
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tial penalties can be draconian. According to the Privacy Project of the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, gay adults in Idaho, who engage
in consensual sexual activity with another of the same sex, must be im-
prisoned for a minimum of five years. In Maryland, Mississippi, Mon-
tana and North Carolina, imprisonment can range up to ten years; in
Michigan and Tennessee, up to fifteen; and in Georgia and Rhode Island,
up to twenty. Repeat offenders in Michigan can be imprisoned for life.29
Because most of these statutes apply equally to heterosexuals as to
homosexuals, it has been argued that equal protection attacks brought by
lesbian and gay defendants against such statutes are without merit.
However, this argument ignores the social context in which these laws
are legislated:
It can not be claimed that sodomy laws.., which fail to distinguish
between heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, do not stigmatize gays any
more than they stigmatize nongays.... [I]n Bowers... Justice Stevens errs
along this line. He accepts Georgia's position.., that it is legitimate for
laws to have a "merely symbolic" function ... but seems to claim that
Georgia's law obviously fails to be rationally related to this legitimate state
function because it does not distinguish between homosexual and heterosex-
ual acts. This view fails to understand symbols. The meaning and force of
a mere symbol cannot be derived independently of the social behavior in
which it is embedded. Whether black cats are taken as symbols of life or
death has nothing to do with the nature of cats.... While this should be
obvious, one example will clear any doubt: People who call for the retention
of immigration discrimination against gays use as their main rationale that
gays have to be kept out of the country lest they break state sodomy laws.
Would anyone ever think of mounting the same argument for keeping
heterosexuals out of the country? So sodomy laws stigmatize gays even if
defining gay people as persons who commit sodomy. See, eg., Gay Activists v. Lomenzo, 66 Misc.
2d 456, 458, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (noting that "in order to be a homosexual, the
prohibited act must at some time been committed, or at least presently contemplated"), rev'd sub
nom. Owles v. Lomenzo, 38 A.D.2d 981, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (App. Div. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Gay
Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1973);
Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (finding the statement that someone is
"queer" slanderous per se because it imputes the crime of sodomy), courts overemphasize the impor-
tance of certain types of homosexual sex and devalue love and companionship in a homosexual
relationship. The assumption that sodomy is more essential to homosexuality than it is to heterosex-
uality ignores the fact that a gay man or lesbian need not be celibate to avoid violating the statutes,
as most statutes do not prohibit genital-hand contact. But see Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.010(2) (1989);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101 (1989). Sodomy statutes also provide a basis for the enforcement of
laws against the solicitation of same-sex activity. See R.D. MOHR, supra note 23, at 54-55.
29. As reported in M. KinK & H. MADSEN, AFrER THE BALL, HOW AMERICA WILL CON-
QUER ITS FEAR & HATRED OF GAYS IN THE 90s 656 (1989). See also Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192
(citing Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 521, 525 n.9 (1986)).
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they do not specifically draw attention to the similarity in gender of the
offending parties.
30
Sodomy statutes have been severely criticized for decades as being
notoriously unenforceable.3 1 In addition to being impractical, serious
questions regarding the legitimacy of the state's interest in criminalizing
private, consensual sexual activity prompted many states to initiate re-
forms.32 By the 1970s, more than half of the states had decriminalized
their statutes so as to permit private, consensual sexual acts. However,
these reforms were achieved only after contentious battles over morality
had been fought with religious leaders. For example, when in the mid-
1960s the New York State legislature sought to repeal the state's sodomy
law, the Roman Catholic hierarchy mounted an effective campaign that
resulted in the reform movement's defeat.33 When, finally in 1980, the
New York Court of Appeals struck down the state's sodomy statute as
an unconstitutional violation of privacy, 34 the church "urged that con-
sensual sodomy must remain a crime because: 'We must take every rea-
sonable step to inhibit [homosexuality's] spread and to eradicate it.' ,,35
Even though sodomy laws have had little practical consequences,
their emotive force for large sections of society perpetuate their existence.
30. R.D. MOHR, supra note 23, at 108-09 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Since the 1960s, a number of states have reformed their sodomy statutes to the extent that they
allow oral and anal sex between heterosexuals, but not between members of the same sex. See, e.g.,
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1989). Such a distinction has given rise to equal protec-
tion arguments. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
For arguments used by the Immigration and Naturalization Service prohibiting the admission of
gays see, e.g., Silvers, The Exclusion and Expulsion of HomosexualAliens, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 295, 314-22 (1984); Fowler & Graff, Gay Aliens and Immigration: Resolving the Conflict Be-
tween Hill and Longstaff, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 621 (1985).
31. See R1D. MOHR, supra note 23, at 51 n.9. Although rare, arrests and prosecutions for sod-
omy are not unheard of, as Bowers v. Hardwick demonstrates. Even without further prosecution, the
mere arrest for same-sex sodomy may result in publicity. See, e.g., Comment, The Louisiana Consti-
tution's Declaration of Rights" Post-Hardwick Protection for Sexual Privacy?, 62 TUL. L. REv. 767,
804 n.208 (1988) (citing testimony by John Anthony D'Emilio).
32. For law review articles which discuss the decriminalization of sodomy statutes see Hughes,
Morals and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE L.J 662 (1962); Schwartz, Morals, Offenses and the Model
Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 669 (1963); Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior. The
Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 UCLA L. REV. 581 (1967);
Comment, The Bedroom Should Not Be Within the Province of the Law, 4 CAL. W.L. REv. 115
(1968); Ford, Homosexuals and the Law: Why the Status Quo?, 5 CAL. W.L. REv. 232 (1969).
33. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1964, at 1; Nov. 25, 1964, at 43; Nov. 26, 1964, at 1; March 17,
1965 at 1; Jun. 4, 1965, at 1; Jul. 23, 1965, at 1.
34. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 987 (1981).
35. See Robinson, People v. Onofre: Can the State Peek Into Your Bedroom?, 2 IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREsT 6, 6-7 (1980).
1990]
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That they stigmatize gays does not seem to be, in and of itself, an ade-
quate explanation for their continuing defense by anti-gay polemicists.
After all, in a society that already holds a deep antipathy toward gay
men and lesbians to begin with, it hardly seems justifiable to have a law
act as a mere symbol; for when laws go unenforced, and everyone knows
that they go unenforced, the legal system risks encouraging disrespect
and cynicism toward law in general. Some other purpose, then, may be
seen to be at work:
When a state has unenforced sodomy laws on its books-not by oversight
but even after the failure of law reform has drawn attention to their exist-
ence, and yet no attempt is made to enforce them though their frequent
violation is a secret to no one-then insult is their main purpose. If the law
is virtually never enforced, the law exists not out of a concern with the
actions of gay people, but with their status.... [S]odomy laws afford an
opportunity for the citizenry to express its raw hatred of gays systematically
and officially without even having publicly to discuss and so justify that
hatred.... [U]nenforced sodomy laws are the chief systematic way that
society as a whole tells gays they are scum.
36
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the majority of the Supreme Court of the
United States upheld as constitutional the right of the states to enact
statutes which have the effect of stigmatizing a whole class of American
citizens. 7 Wrapped in a cloak of moral sentiment, without consideration
for their dignity as persons worthy of fair treatment and equal respect
under the law, the Court allows the states to attack and insult persons as
persons, focusing on irrelevant behavior characteristics, without regard
for their right to privacy, liberty or dignity as autonomous moral actors.
There are complex psychosocial dynamics involved in such a mentality.
In order to determine whether or not law and policies formulated within
such a context are truly moral and democratic, it is necessary to review
the history of sodomy laws as they developed over the course of millen-
nia in Western civilization, "for these attitudes lie deep within the Judeo-
36. R.D. MOHR, supra note 23, at 59-60 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
37. Since Hardwick was decided by the Court, at least two states' highest courts, citing Hard.
wick, have upheld their sodomy statutes as constitutional. See Missouri v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508,
511 (en banc) (Mo. 1986); Louisiana v. Neal, 500 So.2d 374, 378 (La. 1987). Hardwick was cited by
the Arizona Court of Appeals holding that the state's sodomy statute justified the denial of the
adoption of an elementary school child by a bisexual man because possible past, present or future
violations of the statute made him an immoral role model. See In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile
Action B-10489, 151 Ariz. 335, 340, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Ct. App. 1986) ("It would be anomalous for
the state on the one hand to declare homosexual conduct unlawful and on the other create a parent
after that proscribed model, in effect approving that standard, inimical to the natural family, as head
of a state created family.").
[Vol. 38
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Christian tradition.""8
II.
Tis a shame to human nature,
such a head of hair as his;
In the good old time 'twas hanging
for the colour that it is;
Though hanging isn't bad enough
and flaying would be fair
For the nameless and abominable
colour of his hair.39
A. A Queer History: Homosexuality in the Judeo-Christian Moral
Tradition
1. Religion-Homosexuality as Sin.
Perhaps nowhere in the history of morals has biblical literature played a
more explicit, although negative, role than in the case of the Sodom narra-
tive.... [R]eferences to Sodom in writing and speaking, in law and reli-
gion, are... grim reminders of unredeemable degradation matched by a
divine, relentless retribution. "Sodomy" is a code word that encapsulates
the moral heritage of those fierce verses that have branded on human re-
membrance across the centuries the fire and brimstone rained by God on
the disobedient ... '
The Old Testament biblical story of Sodom is, of course, where we
derive the terms sodomy and sodomite. However, what is unknown by
most people is that the story of Sodom never had any uniform tradition
as to the nature of the offense that was committed at Sodom until the first
century of the Christian era. Its exclusively homosexual interpretation
was a relatively late development and one which, for that matter, was
premised on faulty scriptural exegesis. The majority of contemporary
biblical scholars have now concluded that the narrative is not a condem-
nation of gay sexuality. Rather, the offense committed by the Sodomites
was inhospitality.41
38. HUMAN SExuALrTY: NEW DIRECTONS IN AMERICAN CATHOLIC THOUGHT, A STUDY
COMMISSIONED BY THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA 212 [hereinafter HUMAN
SEXUALrrY](A. Kosnik ed. 1979).
39. Housman, supra note 1.
40. G.R. EDWARDS, GAY/LEsBiAN LIBERATION: A BIBLICAL PERSPECTrvE 24 (1984).
41. The application of modem principles of biblical exegesis and scholarship to the oft-quoted
scriptural references, which contemporary translators render as being about homosexuality, reveal
that some of these passages do not involve homosexual activity between consulting adults (Genesis
1990]
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In addition to the Sodom story, there are some dozen or so scrip-
tural references scattered throughout both the Old and New Testaments
that either do refer to, or have been held to be applicable to, homosexual-
ity. Again, the majority of contemporary biblical exegetes have seriously
questioned the nature and interpretation of these texts. Scholars have
determined that they are more about Hebraic cult practices, including
notions of ritual purity and nationalism, than they are about gay sexual-
ity.42 More importantly, none of them understands homosexuality as an
immutable orientation,43 something which prior to the advent of modem
psychology would have been unimaginable. It must be remembered that
before the nineteenth century, the concept of "homosexual" did not exist.
Words that are consistently translated in the biblical texts as "homosex-
ual" or "homosexuality" do not accurately reflect either the sense of the
original language or the intent of the authors. In most instances, these
words have nothing to do with individuals who today we would identify
18-19, Judges 19, 2 Peter 2:6-10, Jude 1:7), and that others involve sexual abuses in cultic practice,
but most probably not of a homosexual type (Deut. 23:17-18, 1 Kings 14:24, 15:12, 22:46 and 2 Kings
23:7). Two Old Testament references (Lev. 18:22 and 20:13) do condemn consenting homosexual
acts which is true also of St. Paul in two passages (1 Car. 5-6 and Romans 1:18-32 and maybe 1 Tim.
1:1-11). However, exegetes have pointed out that none of these understood homosexuality as an
"orientation." (For more on this crucial distinction, see infra note 43). Rather, the authors assume
heterosexual orientation with the actors behaving contrary to their innate, "natural" predisposition.
For in-depth exegetical interpretations of biblical references to homosexuality and analysis of the
Judeo-Christian sexual traditions concerning the same see generally HUMAN SEXUALrrY, supra note
38; G.R. EDWARDS, supra note 40; J. BOSWELL, infra note 46 (especially chapters 4-6); D.S. BAI-
LEY, infra note 47; N. PITTENGER, TIME FOR CONSENT: A CHRISTIAN'S APPROACH To HoMosEx-
uALrrY (1970); J. McNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL (1976); R. SCRoGGs, THE
NEW TESTAMENT AND HOMOSEXUALITY (1983).
42. See supra note 41.
43. Alfred Kinsey demonstrated that homosexual and heterosexual responsiveness to arousal in
human beings is not always clearly differentiated. Kinsey's research suggested level of responsiveness
as points on a continuum that ranges from exclusive heterosexual reactivity to exclusive homosexual
reactivity with various gradations in between. On his seven point scale, Kinsey and his co-workers
developed this continuum based on both overt sexual experience and inner psychological reactions
by his subjects: 0 on the scale denotes exclusive heterosexuality; 1, predominately heterosexual, only
incidentally homosexual; 2, predominantly heterosexual, but more than incidentally homosexual;
3, equally heterosexual and homosexual; 4, predominantly homosexual, but more than incidentally
heterosexual; 5, predominantly homosexual, only incidentally heterosexual; and 6, exclusively homo-
sexual. People who fall in categories 5 or 6 are referred to as having a homosexual "orientation" that
is integral and obligatory to the individual's psychosexual make-up.
For further discussion see A.C. KINSEY & C.E. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE (1948); A.C. KINSEY, W.B. POMEROY, C.E. MARTIN & P.H. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953); see also A.P. BELL & M.S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A
STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN (1978); A.P. BELL, M.S. WEINBERG & S.K.
HAMMERSMITH, SEXUAL PREFERENCE: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN (1981).
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as lesbians or gay men.'
It is both bad theology and bad scholarship to wrench scriptural
texts out of context selectively from various sources to construct a
programmatic interpretation of their meaning. The Bible is a collection
of a multitude of various books written by different authors over a period
of some six thousand years in differing cultural and historical settings.
One can no more look to the Bible as an authoritative guide on human
sexuality than one can as an infallible text on science. Besides the fact
that the Bible itself does not presume to be either, to require people to
believe otherwise demands an act of faith that one should not be com-
pelled to make."
It is not only the Bible which does not speak clearly about gay sexu-
ality. The post-biblical Christian tradition itself is remarkably inconsis-
tent, at least from the earliest days of the church to the twelfth to
fourteenth centuries. During this period of time, more than half of the
Christian era, uniform legislation and enforcement of ecclesiastical or
civil proscriptions against homosexuality barely existed. John Boswell,
Professor and Chairman of the History Department at Yale University,
has written a probing account of the complex dynamics which formed
Western cultural attitudes toward homosexuality:
The early Christian church does not appear to have opposed homosex-
ual behavior.... Hostility to gay people and their sexuality became notice-
able in the West during the period of the dissolution of the Roman state-
i.e., from the third through the sixth centuries.... [Although n]either
Christian society nor Christian theology as a whole evinced or supported
any particular hostility to homosexuality,.., both reflected and in the end
retained positions adopted by some governments and theologians which
could be used to derogate homosexual acts.
Moral theology through the twelfth century treated homosexuality as
at worst comparable to heterosexual fornication but more often remained
silent on the issue. Legal enactments were rare and of dubious efficacy.
44. See supra note 43; see also J. BoswELL, infra note 46, at 41-59, 335-53; D'Emilio, Making
and Unmasking Minorities: The Tensions Between Gay Politics and History, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. 915, 917 (1986); 1 M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALrrY 43 (R. Hurley trans. 1978)
(placing the birth of the "psychological, psychiatric, medical category of homosexuality" in 1870);
V. BULLOUGH, HOMOSEXUALrrY: A HIsTORY 7 (1979).
45. See HUMAN SEXUALrrY, supra note 38, at 23-49.
[O]ne should not look to the Bible for a systematic presentation on sex. The Scriptures
are not a textbook of ethics. Only a few general lines or directions can be abstracted, and
these must be interpreted historically, combined with more adequate scientific knowl-
edge of our times. Simply lining up a catalogue of texts does violence to biblical theology




The... eleventh century was accompanied by the reappearance of...
a substantial gay minority. Gay people were prominent, influential, and
respected.... Opposition to gay sexuality appeared rarely and more as
aesthetic partisanship than as moral ensure ....
[However, in] the twelfth century ... virulent hostility appeared in
popular literature [which] ... spread to theological and legal writings....
[Tihis change [was].... probably closely related to the... increase in
intolerance of minority groups apparent in ecclesiastical and secular institu-
tions throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth enturies.... This intoler-
ance was both reflected in and perpetuated by its incorporation into
theological, moral, and legal compilations of the later Middle Ages, many
of which continued to influence European society for centuries.46
2. Law-Homosexuality as Crime. Anglican biblical scholar Der-
rick Sherwin Bailey traced the legal antecedents which served as a justifi-
cation for the severe proscriptions against homosexual acts in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to Christian emperor Justinian's
Code. Contained within the Code there is recorded probably the most
influential civil sodomy statute in Western civilization. Dating from the
sixth-century, when the Roman Empire in the West was on the verge of
collapse and Justinian, as emperor in the East, was attempting to insure
survival of what remained, the logic of the statute relies on what was by
then the conventional understanding of the biblical Sodom narrative.
Promulgated in A.D. 538, Justinian's 77th Novella reads:
[S]ince certain men, seized by diabolical incitement, practise among them-
selves the most disgraceful lusts, and act contrary to nature: we enjoin them
to take to heart the fear of God and the judgment to come, and to abstain
from suchlike diabolical and unlawful lusts, so that they may not be visited
by the just wrath of God on account of these impious acts, with the result
that cities perish with all their inhabitants. For we are taught by the Holy
Scriptures that because of like impious conduct cities have indeed perished,
together with the men in them.47
For violations of the statute, homosexuals were to be tortured, muti-
lated, paraded in public, and executed.48 In spite of its moral tone, Bos-
well points out that Justinian's motive in criminalizing gay sexuality was
46. J. BOSWELL, CHRIsrIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY 333-34 (1980).
See also Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values Searching for the Hidden Determi-
nants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.. 1073, 1080-1091 (1988). Moreover, the tradition relied
upon by the majority in Hardwick does not justify singling out same-sex sodomy for special treat-
ment. See . D'EMImo & E. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS 30 (1988). Nor do the historical
prohibitions apply to oral sex. See Vieira, Hardwick and the Right of Privacy, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1181, 1184 (1988).
47. D.S. BAILEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION 73 (1955).
48. See 6 PROCOPIUS, WORKS 141 (1935).
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not to turn contemporary understandings of Christian morality into civil
law. For example, in Novella 140, on the basis of common consent, mar-
riages could be dissolved in complete contradiction of both the New Tes-
tament and the early church fathers. 9 Moreover, "not in all cases...
was this punishment inflicted... but only upon those reputed to be
Greens [a political faction] or to be possessed of great wealth or those
who in some way chanced to have offended the rulers."50
From history, it appears that Novella 77 was not concerned with the
legislation and enforcement of morality. Although clothed in religious
garb, the statute's enforcement seems to have been based on purely polit-
ical considerations, facilitating dominance and control over groups
which the power structure either feared or could not tolerate. It is a
political truism that "accusing a person of any major deviance has long
been a good way to get him in trouble for other deviances...." 51
In Western civilization, whenever the social structure has been faced
with a major crisis, whether of a political, religious or cultural nature, the
majority has consistently treated its minorities with suspicion and cen-
sure. This has been demonstrably true for lesbians and gay men. "The
ancient Hebrews equated homosexuality with idolatry and treason; Ro-
man law demanded the death penalty for treason, sacrilege and sodomy;
the church fathers associated sexual deviance with paganism. In the re-
cent past, we saw a national obsession with the homosexual as a security
risk, loyal to godless communism." 2 Throughout Western history, "ho-
mosexuality has remained a common charge against people whose social,
class, or political characteristics arouse antagonism.'""
Sexuality immediately sets the gay man or lesbian apart from the
heterosexual majority and, in periods of societal stress, gays have often
been cast in the role of sexual heretic and traitor. Nowhere has this com-
bination been more clearly illustrated than in that period which Boswell
describes as taking place during the High Middle Ages. Using the Bible,
religion and morality as a means to solidify its hold on power, the
church, along with the state, used "sodomy" as a vehicle to suppress and
persecute minorities whose differences from the majority they could
49. J. BOsWELL, supra note 46, at 172. See also GIBBONS, 4 THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE 439 (1910) (Gibbons states that Justinian's law on homosexual acts was a ruse for
charging those with a crime "to whom no crime could be imputed.").
50. PROCOPIUS, supra note 48, at 144 (parenthetical added).
51. Karlen, Homosexuality in History, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR, A MODERN REAPPRAISAL
75, 89 (J. Marmor ed. 1980) (citations omitted).
52. Id at 88 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 89 (citations omitted).
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either not tolerate or perceived to be a threat to their dominance and
control.
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, many religious splinter groups
began to appear in parts of Europe. One of the most important and influ-
ential of these groups were the Cathars, or Albigensians. They advo-
cated nonviolence, the end of private property, and "spiritual," i.e.,
chaste marriages. As the movement grew in size and influence, especially
in southern France, it attracted the angry attention of the Inquisition.
Opponents claimed that in order to maintain chastity, the Cathars
sodomized their wives; in this they were said to be like the heretical
Bogomile sect of Bulgaria. The French word bougre came into use for sod-
omite, a corruption of the Latin bulgaris. It passed into English as "bug-
ger." Today the commonest English word for anal intercourse, used
synonymously with homosexuality, is an old word for heretic.
Pope Innocent II launched a crusade of a half million men, who
slaughtered the Cathars throughout Provence. Other heretical sects were
accused of sexual deviance and destroyed. The Adamites, Hussites, Breth-
ren of the Free Spirit, and Waldensians were variously accused of sodomy,
incest, bestiality and orgy....
Philip IV of France and Pope Clement V were.., ruthless in defaming
and destroying the Order of the Knights Templars as sodomites and here-
tics in the early fourteenth century in order to seize their treasury. Inquisi-
tors got Templars to admit under torture that.., they had been required to
spit on the cross, enter a pact with the Muslims, and commit sodomy with
any Templar who demanded it. This formula of charges-heresy, treason,
and homosexuality-became routine in heresy and witchcraft trials.
5 4
As with Justinian, the medieval ruling authorities appropriated for
themselves one politically expedient interpretation of the biblical sources
in order to exercise power and control. In the process, they established
their use of the texts as the only official, unquestioned and "orthodox"
interpretation, erecting precedents both with respect to Western sexual
morality and civil law. Since the close of the fourteenth century, both
moral theology and jurisprudence have, in no uncertain terms, reflected
this understanding:
[T]here is nothing in the English-American social structure which has had
more influence upon present patterns of sexual behavior than the religious
backgrounds of that culture. It would require long research and a complete
volume to work out the origins of the present-day religious codes which
apply to sex, of the present-day sex mores, of the coded sex laws, and to
trace the subtle ways in which these have influenced the behavior of individ-
uals.... Ancient religious codes are still the prime source of the attitudes,
54. Id. at 88-9 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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the ideals, and the rationalizations by which most individuals pattern their
sexual lives.
55
Even as late as the 1950s in the United States, the impact of this
heritage was the driving force behind the preservation of sodomy' legisla-
tion in the fifty states. In his attempt to undertake a comprehensive re-
valuation of homosexuality in Christian theology, Bailey closed his 1955
book with the thirteenth century because, in his words, "it does not ap-
pear that the tradition has undergone any significant alteration since that
time." 6 John D'Emilio, a well-known historian of sexual history,. has
written that Bailey "found the antihomosexual interpretation of the
Sodom episode 'accepted without question' and at the base of 'the
thought and imagination of the West on the matter of homosexual
practices.' t57
D'Emilio's writings shed a great deal of light on the transplantation
of Western Europe's moral terror of gay sexual practices to America:
Biblical condemnations of homosexual behavior suffused American
culture from its origin.... Colonial ministers railed against sodomy in
their sermons....
The law stipulated harsh punishments for homosexual acts. Colonial
legal codes... prescribed death for sodomy, and in several instances the
courts directed the execution of men found guilty of this act.... Although
... states abolished the death penalty... all but two in 1950 still classified
it as a felony. Only murder, kidnapping, and rape elicited heavier
sentences.
Although comparatively few... suffered the full punishment permit-
ted under these laws, the statutes imposed the stigma of criminality upon
same-sex eroticism. The severity with which the legislature and magistrates
viewed homosexual behavior... buttressed the enforcement of a wide range
of other penal code provisions against homosexuals and lesbians.... Court
proceedings seemed designed to instill feelings of shame and obliterate self-
esteem.... [J]udges commonly directed gratuitous, abusive language at
defendants.
58
55. A.C. KINSEY, supra note 43, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE, at 465.
56. D.S. BAILEY, supra note 47, at viii; cf 27, 152.
57. J. D'EMILIO, supra note 24, at 13-14 (quoting D.S. BAILEY, supra note 56).
58. Id. at 13-15 (citations omitted). D'Emilio notes that,
Through penal code revisions and court rulings, statutes had also become more inclusive
in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. State legislatures rewrote laws
and judges reinterpreted them, so that erotic activity between women and oral sex be-
tween men fell within the domain of the sodomy and "crime against nature" statutes....
As a gay subculture took root in twentieth - century American cities, police invoked
laws against disorderly conduct, vagrancy, public lewdness, assault, and solicitation in
order to haul in their victims. Gay men who made assignations in public places, lesbians
and homosexuals who patronized gay bars, and occasionally even guests at gay parties in
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3. Psychiatry-Homosexuality as Illness. Reinforcing the prohibi-
tions against homosexuality which now suffused Western law and moral-
ity, a new, third influence did much to confirm and justify in the minds of
many the legitimacy of their condemnation. Increasingly, gay men and
lesbians found themselves the object of intense medical attention. "Be-
sides facing the moral condemnation of the churches and the punish-
ments imposed by law, gay men and women found themselves
scrutinized by a medical profession that diagnosed homosexuality as a
disease."
59
Hidden within another ironic fold of history, it is often forgotten
that Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, did not himself con-
sider homosexuality to be a psychopathology. Yet, the strongest propo-
nents of homosexuality as a mental illness have been psychoanalysts. In
his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud had written that ho-
mosexuality "is found in people who exhibit no other serious deviations
from the normal... whose efficiency is unimpaired, and who are indeed
distinguished by specially high intellectual development and ethical cul-
ture."'  Again, in an interview reported in a Vienna newspaper, Freud is
quoted as saying that he was of the firm conviction that "homosexuals
must not be treated as sick people.... Wouldn't that oblige us to char-
acterize as sick many great thinkers and scholars of all time, who's...
orientation we know for a fact and whom we admire precisely because of
their mental health? Homosexual persons are not sick."6
Freud was adamantly consistent in this matter throughout his entire
private homes risked arrest. Vice squad officers, confident that their targets did not dare
to challenge their authority, were free to engage in entrapment. Anxious to avoid addi-
tional notoriety, gay women and men often pleaded guilty even when police lacked suffi-
cient evidence to secure convictions.
Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted).
For more detailed documentation of gay life in American history see J. KATZ, GAY AMERICAN
HISTORY (1976); J. KATz, GAY LESBIAN ALMANAC (1982); A. BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDER
FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR Two (1990). For documentation
of homosexual activity in colonial America see Oaks, Things Fearful to Name: Sodomy and Buggery
in Seventeenth-Century New England, 12 J. OF Soc. HIsT. 268 (1978); V.L. BULLOUGH, SEXUAL
VARIANCE IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY 504 (1980).
59. J. D'EMILIo, supra note 24, at 15. For an analysis of the development of sexuality as a field
of medical science and research see M. FOUCAULT, supra note 44; J.S. HALLER & R.M. HALLER,
THE PHYSICIAN AND SEXUALrrY IN VICTORIAN AMERICA (1974); J. KATZ, supra note 58, GAY
AMERICAN HISTORY, at 129-207; J. D'EMILIO & E. FREEDMAN, supra note 46.
60. Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in 7 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 135, 138-39 (J. Strachey trans. 1933). For a critique
of the moral repercussions of Freudian analysis see Murphy, Freud Reconsidered: Bisexuality, Ho.
mosexuality, and Moral Judgment, 9 . OF HOMOSEXUALITY 65 (1984).
61. Die Zeit (Vienna) Oct. 27, 1903, at 5.
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life. In his now famous "Letter to an American Mother," Freud wrote:
"Homosexuality... is nothing to be ashamed of, no vice, no degradation,
it cannot be classified as an illness."62 In a similar correspondence with
Ernest Jones in 1921, in which Jones had expressed his contention that it
was improper to admit a doctor widely known to be a gay man into
membership in the psychoanalytic association, Freud and Otto Rank
jointly replied that: "[W]e cannot exclude such persons without other
sufficient reasons, as we cannot agree with their legal prosecution. We
feel that a decision in such cases should depend upon a thorough exami-
nation of the other qualities of the candidate... 63
In spite of Freud's clear position on homosexuality, his followers
used psychoanalysis as a "scientific" justification for keeping both moral
and legal sanctions firmly in place.
Medical views bore a complex relation to the older perspectives of religion
and law. In important ways they reinforced the cultural matrix that con-
demned and punished persons who engaged in homosexual activity.
Whether seen as sin, crime, or sickness, homosexuality stigmatized an indi-
vidual. Doctors did not ply their trade in a vacuum... and the language of
the moralist permeated the scientific literature.
64
In analyzing the "scientific" arguments concerning the abnormality
of gay sexuality, Judd Marmor, Adjunct Professor of Psychiatry at the
University of California Los Angeles School of Medicine, Professor of
Psychiatry Emeritus at the University of Southern California School of
Medicine, and past president of the American Psychiatric Association,
has concluded that psychoanalytic theories concerning homosexuality,
many of which are mutually contradictory and none of which are pa-
thognomonic for all homosexuals, are based on therapeutic experiences
with neurotic homosexual patients. To attribute these theories to all gay
people is as unwarranted as similar generalizations about heterosexuals
would be based only on experiences with neurotic heterosexuals.
Countless objective psychological tests have been done by now on nonpa-
tient groups of homosexuals with matched groups of heterosexuals....
With surprising uniformity, the vast majority of these studies have shown
few, if any, significant differences in personality structure between the two
groups and no greater psychopathology among nonpatient homosexuals
than among matched heterosexual controls....
62. Freud, Letter to an American Mother, 102 AM. J. op PSYCHIATRY 786 (1951).
63. Letter from Sigmund Freud and Otto Rank to Ernest Jones (December 11, 1921) (The
correspondence between Freud, Rank and Jones was discovered in the course of research by J.D.
Steakley and was subsequently published in Body Politic, May 1977, at 9).
64. J. D'EMILIO, supra note 24, at 17-18.
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It is manifestly unwarranted and inaccurate . . . to attribute . . .
neuroticism... to intrinsic aspects of homosexuality itself ... In actual
fact many homosexuals, both male and female, function responsibly and
honorably in positions of the highest trust and live emotionally stable, ma-
ture, and well-adjusted lives that are indistinguishable from those of well-
adjusted heterosexuals, except for their different sexual preferences.
65
Similar conclusions, having been reached by eminent and well-
respected mental health professionals from years of objective research,
prompted the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, in December 1973, to remove homosexuality as a mental illness
from the second edition of the APA's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
for Mental Disorders (DMS-II). In reflecting upon the cultural dynam-
ics which formed the psychosocial structure of Western society's treat-
ment of its gay members, Marmor confirms that,
[t]he legal, moral and stigmatizing aspects of the issue of homosexual-
ity are so closely intertwined as to be almost inseparable. The laws of a
society, in matters such as these, are simply encoded reflections of its moral
values. In Western culture in general, the prevailing attitudes toward ho-
mosexuality derive from Judeo-Christian tradition....
[P]rimarily on the basis of these religious teachings, homosexuals have
been subjected to legal discrimination and persecution throughout Western
culture ... at times in proportions bordering on genocide....
Clearly, behind this selective focus on the "unnatural sin" of homosex-
uality lie deep-seated fears and anxieties-fears that have [been] ... sub-
sumed under the concept of homophobia....
[T]he etiology of homosexuality is affected by many factors, some pos-
sibly genetic or constitutional.... People do not "choose" to be homosex-
ual any more than they "choose" to be heterosexual....
The vast majority of homosexual men and women ask only to be ac-
cepted as human beings and allowed to live their lives free of persecution or
discrimination....
[T]he legalization of homosexual behavior between consenting adults
and the outlawing of discriminatory practices against homosexuals is a first
and necessary step in making it possible for the millions of men and women
[who] ... through no fault of their own, have [been] rendered.., erotically
responsive to their own sex to live lives of dignity and self-respect.
66
65. Marmor, Epilogue Homosexuality and the Issue of Mental Illness, in HOMOSEXUAL BE-
HAVIOR, A MODERN REAPPRAISAL 400 (J. Marmor ed. 1980) (citations omitted).
66. Marmor, Overview: The Multiple Roots of Homosexual Behavior, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAV-
ioR, A MODERN REAPPRAISAL 18-21 (3. Marmor ed. 1980) (citations omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal). Kinsey supports Marmor's assertion that psychoanalytic and legal doctrines merely reflect
encoded religious teachings. According to Kinsey, "[S]cientific classifications... [are] nearly identi-
cal with theologic classifications and with moral pronouncements of the fifteenth century." A.C.
KINSEY, supra note 43, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE, at 202. Marmor notes that,
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B. Conclusion
Religion, law and science are the three great pillars of Western civi-
lization. Yet, individually and combined, their invocation has been used
to excoriate the West's minorities. One only has to reflect on the plight
of Europe's Jews or America's Native Americans and Blacks to under-
stand the degree to which intolerance and oppression have found force in
their perversion.
Gay people, no less, have had their identity and history shaped by
the majority's perceptions of them. Religion manipulated Scripture to
accuse them of sin, the law used religion to judge them as felons, and
science rationalized the results by diagnosing them as diseased. To-
gether, the three labeled gay men and lesbians as immoral, criminal and
Genocidal laws against homosexuals remained in the criminal codes in France until
1791, in England until 1861, and in Scotland as late as 1889 .... [HMomosexuals were
subject to capital punishment in a number of American colonies .... [I]n Hitler's Ger-
many estimates ... of the number of homosexuals who died... range... to more than
400,000.
Marmor, supra, at 18-19.
For biographical accounts of Nazi persecution of homosexuals see H. HEGER, THE MEN WITH
THE PINK TRIANGLE (D. Ferribach trans. 1980); R. PLANr, THE PINK TRIANGLE, THE NAZI WAR
AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS (1986).
"Homophobia" is defined by Marmor as "a pathological fear of homosexuality usually based on
one or more of the following factors: (1) a deep-seated insecurity concerning one's own sexuality and
gender identity, (2) a strong religious indoctrination, or (3) simple ignorance about homosexuals."
Marmor, supra, at 19. See afso G. WEINBERG, SOCIETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL (1973)
(the work which coined the term 'homophobia'). In analyzing the role of homophobia in law and
legislation, Marmor comments that,
There is no doubt that ultimately an enlightened and civilized society must rid itself of
its homophobic fears and prejudices .... [L]egal sanctions against homosexual behavior,
... have no effect on the incidence of homosexuality; there is no evidence that its fre-
quency is any higher in countries like France, Sweden and the Netherlands, where it has
been decriminalized, than in the United States, where it has not....
[Tihere is an increasing trend in the Western world... to legalize homosexual behav-
ior between consenting adults in private, and to also outlaw discrimination against
homosexuals in employment, housing, public accommodation and licensing. It should
be emphasized that, contrary to homophobic propaganda, such legislation does not
mean the condoning of the seduction of minors or the violation of reasonable standards
of publi decency .....
Marmor, supra, at 20.
For a discussion of possible biological and genetic links in homosexual development see J.
MONEY, GAY, STRAIGHT, AND IN-BETWEEN: THE SEXOLOGY OF EROTIC ORIENTATION (1988);
Money, Genetic and ChromosomalAspects of Homosexual Etiology, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR, A
MODERN REAPPRAISAL 59 (1980); M. RUSE, HOMOSEXUALITY (1988); Tourney, Hormones and
Homosexuality, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR, A MODERN REAPPRAISAL 41 (1980); F. WHITMAN &
R. MATHY, MALE HOMOSEXUALITY IN FOUR SOCIETIES (1986) (chapter 7); R.C. Pillard & J.D.
Weinrich, Evidence of Familial Nature of Male Homosexuality, in 43 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSY-
CHIATRY 808 (1986); see also A.P. BELL, M.S. WEINBERG & S.K. HAMMERSMITH, supra note 43.
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sick. But as research and scholarship make clear, the sources from
which justifications for this moral stigmatization are alleged to arise seem
not so much to condemn homosexuality as much as society's intolerance
of homosexuality is being used to interpret the sources.
The West's religiously-based moral heritage with respect to lesbians
and gay men is, at best, disingenuous and, at worst, corrupt. It repre-
sents and perpetuates a legacy of intolerance, oppression and hatred
which cannot legitimately be invoked against gay people with any consis-
tency and still be characterized as moral. The extent to which our con-
stitutional democracy allows sectarian elements to establish this tradition
as the official state morality, with the imprimatur of the government and
courts, is to seriously call into question whether or not a violation of the
First Amendment's establishment clause is taking place. Its continuing
and pervasive influence over law, policy and politics in this nation subju-
gates millions to a hegemonic system of religiously-based morality while
disenfranchising them from democratic entitlements which others take
for granted.
III.
Oh a deal of pains he's taken
and a pretty price he's paid
To hide his poll or dye it
of a mentionable shade;
But they've pulled the beggar's hat off
for the world to see and stare,
And they're hauling him to justice
for the colour of his hair.67
What is shocking and wrong is not the idea that the community's
morality counts, but what counts for the community's morality.
H.L.A. Hart
A. Moral Decision-Making in Democratic Law and Policy
1. Descriptive and Normative Morality. In their opinion in Hard-
wick, the majority justified their refusal to entertain an equal protection
challenge to Georgia's sodomy statute under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's due process clause with the simplistic rationalization that the law
67. Housman, supra note 1.
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expressed a legitimate state purpose in promoting "morality."6 More-
over, the Court defined morality to mean "the majority sentiments about
morality."'69 However, what if ten years from today the majority changes
its mind, and what was previously immoral is now deemed to be moral?
Such has been the case with issues ranging from contraception to divorce
in the past thirty years. Surely morality as a concept must stand for
more than what the latest opinion poll indicates is the mood of the ma-
jority, and certainly law must be based on more than majoritarian
whimsy and arbitrary caprice.
The Hardwick Court errs in that it employs a merely descriptive
notion of morality, which is to say that, for them, morality simply con-
sists of the current belief system accepted by the majority in society. In
utilizing this general descriptive approach, "every society has a moral-
ity-even Nazi society, which had racism and mob rule as central fea-
tures of its popular 'morality.' "70 It follows that simply appealing to
"majority sentiment" as a rationale for upholding Georgia's sodomy stat-
ute is illegitimate. For "a lot of [people] saying something is good, even
over eons, does not make it so. Our rejection of the long history of so-
cially approved and state-enforced slavery is a good example of this prin-
ciple at work. Slavery would be wrong even if nearly everyone liked
it." 7 1
In order to prevent morality from being reduced to an entirely rela-
tive concept, it is necessary to have a conception of morality which is in
some sense normative. A normative morality must be consistent, one to
which all citizens can give their assent and, when applied, does not evi-
dence prejudice or intolerance. By virtue of a common humanity, all
persons are equal with respect to their dignity as persons. One person
cannot be more or less of a person than some other persons. Thus, the
equality to which all persons must be entitled to under just and moral
laws is a circumstantial equality: an equality which requires that all be
accorded equal status of citizenship with suffrage, and equal rights and
consideration in the formulation of those laws under which they live.
This we call the moral attitude: the acceptance of the equal worth of all.
A law is moral in according a citizen unequal treatment only to the
68. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196. Although dismissed out of hand by the Court citing "moral"
justifications, equal protection arguments against sodomy statutes are far from exhausted. See, e.g.,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 15-24 (Harvard Law Review eds. 1990). See also infra notes
106-109 and accompanying text.
69. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
70. R.D. MOHR, supra note 23, at 31.
71. Id. at 32.
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extent that the claims of all to equality require it. For example, assuming
an a priori equal claim of all to the right to life, citizens who violate that
right may be constrained by law in their liberty to act as they please.
One has liberty of action only with respect to the claims of all to circum-
stantial equality. Thus, when one violates the equality of others, she has
acted immorally and may be legitimately constrained for the benefit of
all. However, where the equal claim to a right is not at issue, a law
which imposes merely arbitrary constraints manifests an immoral atti-
tude by violating a person's right to dignity of personhood as an autono-
mous moral actor.72
72. My standard of equal rights and equal consideration as a moral standard is influenced by the
liberal legal theorist John Rawls. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Rawls, The Basic
Liberties and Their Priority, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND LAW: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON
MORAL PHILOSOPHY (S.M. McMurran ed. 1987).
Much has been written concerning awls' A THEORY OF JUSTICE. See, e.g., B. BARRY, THE
LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLE DOCTRINES IN 'A
THEORY OF JUSTICE' BY JOHN RAWLS (1973); I. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 248-54
(1977); R.P. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAwLs: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF A THE-
ORY OF JUSTICE (1977). Rawls' theory has held a pre-eminent position in contemporary moral and
legal philosophy for nearly a quarter century. Recently, however, his approach has been increas-
ingly challenged for elevating justice as the primary virtue in society over and against any communi-
tarian good. See, eg., M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). But see J.
REIMAN, JUSTICE & MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1990) (especially 206-12 critiquing Sandel and
reinterpreting Rawls). Communitarians such as Sandel have contended that in order to postulate
justice as the primary virtue over any particularized end or good, one must presuppose the nature of
the moral subject as separate from his own particular end. Otherwise, one could not conceive of any
rules which would be reasonable for the moral subject independent of his own particular end.
The communitarians have taken Rawls to mean that the primacy of justice as conceived in his
"original position" posits the moral actor as choosing his end from among a range of possible ends,
rather than as discovering his own end within himself as connected to, or constitutive of, who he is.
From the communitarian perspective, what Rawls proposes is that, "[w]hat separates us is in some
important sense prior to what connects us-epistemologically prior as well as morally prior. We are
distinct individuals first, then we form relationships and engage in co-operative arrangements with
others ...." M. SANDEL, supra, at 133.
For communitarians, this cannot conceivably be the case since such a moral actor cannot be
shown to exist. According to these critics, the moral subject is inseparable from his end. Thus,
Rawls' A THEORY OF JUSTICE is premised on a misconceived philosophical anthropology. Feminist
theorists have also criticized Rawls for emphasizing justice over an ethic of care, without which they
contend morality lacks a wholeness which an emphasis on rights can never achieve: "While an ethic
of justice proceeds from the premise of equality-that everyone should be treated the same-an ethic
of care rests on the premise of nonviolence-that no one should be hurt.... ." C. GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 174 (1982). See also
Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstract Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of
Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M.L. REV. 613 (1986). For feminist critiques of communitarian
thought see A. MCLNTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY OF MORAL THEORY (1981); Greechner,
Feminist Concerns with the New Communitarians" We Don't Need Another Hero, in LAW AND THE
COMMUNITY: THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM? 119 (1989).
Notwithstanding the critics, who's projects seem to be more deconstructionist than alternative,
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[A] comprehensive and defensible morality can be founded on considera-
tion of its effects on the members of a moral society and in no other way.
Long-run practical considerations indicate the desirability of certain atti-
tudes.... [S]imilarly, long-run considerations of one's relationships with
others indicate the desirability of the moral attitude, which is defined as the
acceptance of the equal worth of all....
[A] community (or an attitude, a system of laws, etc.) [is] moral inso-
far as it accepts the principle that every person has equal ights.... To
"have equal rights" is to have an equal claim to consideration, and a society
with this commitment can justify divergences of actual consideration only
when these can be shown to be required in order to serve the claims of all."
Any "morality" which, instead, seeks to impose a merely descriptive
morality based on "majority sentiments," no matter how widely or
strongly held, should be rejected as normative, for "[tihe voice of the
people is not the voice of morality."'74 "[T]he ultimate appeal is to an
objective truth and not to our beliefs about it."'75 Similarly, appeals to
standards of morality based on religious origins, which have as their
premise a divine revelation, cannot legitimately serve as a normative mo-
rality. For, even given the existence of God,
we would still need independent standards of morality by which to tell if
Rawls nevertheless re-articulates for contemporary society the Kantian "categorical imperative"
that persons are to be treated as an end rather than a means. Every person in society is to be ac-
corded the same rights as every other person, irrespective of position, wealth or status, and no person
may gain an advantage at the expense of another. Personal liberty may be curtailed only in the event
that not to do so would present a serious infringement on the liberty of another. Moreover, as J.
REIMAN, supra, points out, "justice limits force to that amount that protects everyone from being
subjugated by others, it protects the social space in which individuals can voluntarily embrace a
relationship with others." Id at 212.
Although Rawls has not spoken directly to the issue of gay sexual activity, his theory nevertheless
implies certain obvious conclusions. If people are "to have an equal right to the most extensive total
system of liberty compatible with a similar system of liberty for all," J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF
JUsTicE, supra, at 302, it follows that if the system of liberty entails a basic right to consensual
sexual expression, everyone must have the freedom to pursue that right with whomsoever one
pleases. Rawls himself supports this proposition. Even though he does not offer a discussion of
sexual freedom in his work, he has nevertheless remarked that principles ofjustice require that the
state tolerate sexual relationships which some members of society might find "degrading and shame-
ful." Id at 331. Thus, as Dworkin has stated,
We may therefore say that justice as fairness rests on the assumption of a natural right of
all men and women to equality of concern and respect, a right they possess not by virtue
of birth or characteristic or merit or excellence but simply as human beings with the
capacity to make plans and give justice.
R. DWORKIN, supra, at 182.
73. M. SCRIVEN, PRIMARY PHILOSOPHY 299, 240-41 (1966) (parenthetical in original) (empha-
sis in original).
74. Id at 294.
75. Id at 232.
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God is good. For, if the standards are not independent, it is only a defini-
tional truth that He is good; and it cannot then be a definitional truth that
we should do what is good, since neither definition implies the other. In
fact, we have to choose between two definitions; and one choice leads to a
secular morality, the other to a pointless one.
76
Likewise, appeals to the Bible for standards of morality are faulty.
It is irrational to insist that the Bible is the final arbiter of morality sim-
ply because it is claimed that the Bible is the ultimate moral authority,
either because of its alleged divine origins or its time-honored status in
Western culture. Without an independent and objective criteria against
which to measure the morality of the Bible's position on a given issue, the
arguments simply become tautological. This type of reasoning may be
appropriate for an act of blind faith, but it is a type of reasoning which no
one should be compelled to make short of external, independent and ob-
jective criteria by which to determine whether or not the Bible's position
on a topic is, in fact, a moral one.
A normative morality, then, must be a "secular morality," one
which is both "objective" as to principles and "independent" as to stan-
dards. Otherwise, we are left only with subjectivity and bias: a free-
floating conception of morality propelled under the influence of
majoritarian prejudices. The inevitable result is the suppression of equal
rights without rational justifications. Participatory and representative
democracy, above all other forms of government, is predicated by defini-
tion on a conception of normative morality; for when the constitution of
a country talks about all the people being equal,
it does not imply they are equally strong, intelligent or virtuous, and it does
not imply they should receive equal incomes; it simply means they have
equal rights, i.e., they must be given equal consideration in the formulation
and application of the law of the land and the actions of its government and
people.... [Tihe axiom of equal rights, which we have taken to define
morality, is often thought of as a definition of democracy.
77
When it comes to the subject of homosexuality, there is a presump-
tion in America that "millennia of moral teaching" condemns it. This is
simplistic as it is inaccurate. To the extent that it is a "moral" evalua-
tion, it is clearly a descriptive morality based on popular sentiment and
conviction which have as their ground certain Western Judeo-Christian
religious doctrines concerning the morality of gay sexuality. That there
are, in fact, many non-Western societies which tolerate, and even en-
76. Id at 233 (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at 242.
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courage, homosexuality, indicates the extent to which these Western
moral assumptions are culturally conditioned and parochial."8 "Anthro-
pology has shown that each and every society-however much it may
differ from the next-thinks that its own central norms are dictated by
and conform with nature writ large. That this is so should raise doubts
that neutral principles are to be found.., that will condemn homosexu-
ality."79 Daniel Maquire, Professor of Ethics at Marquette University,
has written that we are ethically obliged to reject cultural principles
which have as their foundation erroneously-based assumptions:
[W]e may have to leave our principles when we discover they have spurious
origins. There are bad principles, just as there are bad prophets. Principles
are not ex nihlo. Their breeding ground is history.... [P]eople in evaluat-
ing the eroticism of persons who are homosexual, operate out of a principle
that bans all homosexual love-making. The roots of that principle are as
many as they are suspect ... bad biology... depersonalized views of sexu-
ality... bad exegesis of the Judaeo-Christian scriptures ... those whose
own heterosexual identity is unsure. The issue of homosexual love-making
cannot be handled by reasonings which simply resonant with tainted
origins.
The dissenting Justices in Hardwick understood that just laws in a
democratic society must be based on a normative morality of equal rights
and equal consideration, not "majority sentiments." They criticized the
majority for ignoring the Court's own precedents which had struck down
as unconstitutional attempts by government to enforce popular biases
and prejudices:
The assertion that 'traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe' the con-
duct involved ... cannot provide an adequate justification.... That cer-
78. See THE MANY FACES OF HOMOSEXUALITY: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES To HOMO-
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR (E. Blackwood ed. 1986); Carrier, Homosexual Behavior in Cross-Cultural Per-
spective, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR, A MODERN REAPPRAISAL 100-22 (J. Marmor ed. 1980); G.
HERDT, GUARDIANS OF THE FLUTE: IDIOMS OF MASCULINrITY 232-39; 284-88 (1981); G. HERDT,
RITUALIZED HOMOSEXUALITY IN MELANESIA (1984); B. HINscH, PASSIONS OF THE CUT SLEEVE:
THE MALE HOMOSEXUAL TRADITION IN CHINA (1990); W, WILLIAMS, THE SPIRIT AND THE
FLESH: SEXUAL DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN INDIAN CULTURE (1986) (especially pages 18-22); Ros-
coe, A Bibliography of Berdache and Alternative Gender Roles Among North American Indians, 14 J.
oF HOMOSEXUALrrY 81 (1987); Whitehead, The Bow and the Burden Strap: A New Look at Institu-
tionalized Homosexuality in Native North America, in SEXUAL MEANINGS: THE CULTURAL CON-
STRUCTION OF GENDER AND SEXUALITY 80 (Ortner and Whitehead eds. 1981). See generally C.A.
TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX (1975); D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 132-36
(1977) (reviewing the anthropological research involving homosexual practices in non-Western
societies).
79. RID. MOHR, supra note 23, at 37 (citations omitted).
80. Maquire, Death and Resurrection of Moral Theology, reprinted in COMMONWEALTH, Nov.
15, 1974, at 144-45.
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tain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn the behavior at issue
gives the State no license to impose their judgment on the entire citizenry.
The legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on whether the State
can advance some justification for its law beyond conformity to religious
doctrine.... A State can no more punish private behavior because of reli-
gious intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus.
'The Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it tolerate
them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law can-
not, directly or indirectly give them effect.' No matter how uncomfortable a
certain group may make the majority of this Court, we have held that
'[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the
deprivation of a person's physical liberty.' 1
2. The Phenomenology of Stigma: The Spoiled Identity. Legal lan-
guage is neither innocent nor accidental. Ostensibly, the intent of the
majority's decision to uphold Georgia's sodomy statute was to allow the
legislation of "morality." However, if purpose may be inferred from ef-
fect, it is demonstrably true that the effect of such legislation has been to
promote a religiously-based moral stigma against gay men and lesbians,
not enforce standards of "morality."82 Thus, the Court's purpose in up-
81. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)).
82. Moreover, the variously suggested non-moralistic rationales for the legislation and enforce-
ment of sodomy statutes are equally without merit or defensibility. Arguments that gay men dispro-
portionately molest children have been discredited. See R. GISSER, HIDDEN VIcTIMs: THE SEXUAL
ABUSE OF CHILDREN 75 (1979). Because no commentators have asserted a correlation between
lesbianism and child molestation, no research has been conducted to disprove such a claim.
Sodomy statutes do not encourage or strengthen heterosexual marriage. Cf Geis, Reported Conse-
quences of Decriminalization of Consenting Adult Homosexuality in Seven States, 1 . HOMOSEXUAL-
rry 419 (1976) (noting that the decriminalization of sodomy has had no effect on the amount of
private homosexual behavior).
An alleged state interest in the protection of public health also fails. Although the disproportion-
ately high incidence of AIDS among gay men might support a state's argument that an important
governmental health interest is at stake, lesbians as a group have almost no risk of contracting the
disease through sexual contact. See Meuller, The Epidemiology of the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Infection, 14 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 250, 256 (1986) ("At present there is no evidence of
[HIV] transmission between lesbians."). Furthermore, members of the gay male community have
modified their sexual practices to a remarkable degree to reduce the risk of contracting AIDS. See
Martin, The Impact of AIDS on Gay Male Sexual Behavior in New York City, 77 AM. J. Pun.
HEALTH 578, 581 (1987); Winkelstein, Padian, Wiley, Lang, Anderson & Levy, The San Francisco
Men's Health Study III Reduction in Human Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission Among Homo-
sexual/Bisexual Men, 1982, 77 AMJ. PuB. HEALTH 685, 687-88 (1987).
Even if sodomy statutes were more narrowly tailored to prohibit only same-sex sodomy between
males, they would still be grossly overinclusive, as not all prohibited acts carry a high risk of trans-
mission. See Padian, Marquis, Francis, Anderson, Rutherford, O'Malley & Winkelstein, Male-to-
Female Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 J. A.M.A. 788, 789 (1987) (noting
that oral sex appears not to have accounted for any reported cases of transmission). But see Toaani,
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holding Georgia's statute, while at the same time rejecting an equal pro-
tection challenge, is to intentionally perpetuate the stigmatization of gays
as immoral, criminal and sick.
Stigma is a concept employed to describe that process whereby an
individual or group of individuals as a whole are characterized as unwor-
thy by the dominant culture 3 and, in particular, a method by which
people are labeled and treated by the majority as inferior.8 4 This phenom-
enon has been demonstrated to exemplify the treatment of gay men and
lesbians by heterosexuals in the Judeo-Christian West. 5 Specifically,
whenever an individual,
is presented before us, evidence can arise of his possessing an attribute that
makes him different from the others... in the extreme, a person who is
quite thoroughly bad, dangerous, or weak. He is thus reduced in our minds
from a whole or usual person to a tainted, discounted one. Such an attri-
bute is a stigma.8 6
In our Western culture, three distinct personal attributes can be dis-
cerned which generally form the base from which an individual is
stigmatized:
First, there are abominations of the body-the various physical deformities.
Next, there are blemishes of individual character perceived as weak will,
domineering or unnatural passions ... these being inferred from a known
record of, for example, mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcohol-
ism, homosexuality.... Finally, there are the tribal stigma of race, nation
and religion.
8 7
As a moral stigma, homosexuality has much in common with the
stigmas of physical deformities or racial class, as well as significant differ-
Doubt Cast on 2 Safe-Sex Practices, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 28, 1987, at 1A, col. 1 (describing a
European medical study suggesting that persons may be able to contract HIV through oral sex).
In addition to the fact that the risks associated with HIV transmission depend on the acts them-
selves rather than the gender of the participants, and that sodomy laws are both overinclusive and
underinclusive, same-sex sodomy statutes are not the least restrictive means of controlling AIDS.
See, e.g., Sullivan & Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv.
139, 182-89 (1989) (favoring disclosure requirements and precautions over more restrictive alterna-
tives, but ultimately finding any use of the criminal law to deter AIDS overly intrusive). Education
and tort suits against persons transmitting AIDS through sexual conduct are other viable alterna-
tives for deterring AIDS transmission. Id at 192-93.
83. See E. GoFFmAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF A SPOILED IDENTITY (1963).
84. Id
85. See, ag., L. HUMPHREYS, OUT OF THE CLOSETS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF HOMOsExUAL LIB-
ERATION (1972); S. LYMAN & M. SCOTT, A SOCIOLOGY OF THE ABSURD (1970); SEXUALrrY:
ENCOUNTERS, IDENTITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS 99 (C.A.B. Warren ed. 1977).
86. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 83, at 3.
87. Id at 5 (emphasis added).
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ences. "Like physical handicap or racial group, moral failings are seen as
'tainting' the entire individual.""8 However, whereas Blacks or the hand-
icapped are perceived as inferior due to physical characteristics, homo-
sexuals, although etymologically conceived of in reference to a distinct
type of behavior, are generally viewed not as individuals who do a certain
type of thing, "but, rather as people who are a certain type of being. This
... is reflected in the fact that the English language has no verb 'to
homosexual' as it does for many other behaviors such as 'to swim' or 'to
write.' "89
Stigma depends upon the social context within which an individual
or group finds itself. As I have maintained above, there are many non-
Western societies which tolerate, or even encourage, homosexual behav-
ior within the parameters of socially-constructed institutions and
norms. However, in the Judeo-Christian West, certain religious doc-
trines concerning the morality of homosexuality, through their enforce-
ment in law and their rationalization by science, have contributed to the
formation of a religiously-based moral tradition which has stigmatized
gay sexuality:
[H]omosexuals as a group remain stigmatized in the United States....
They are forbidden to serve in the armed forces, experience employment
and housing discrimination, and suffer rejection by friends and family. The
knowledge of the fact that they might be rejected and shunned, even if they
never experience stigmatization directly, keeps many homosexuals in a state
of diffuse anxiety about their relationships with the heterosexual world.91
While there are many ways in which lesbians and gay men try to
reconcile their sexual orientation with society's stigma against them,9 a
"[a]ll these ways involve a considerable investment of emotional energy,
and most take a considerable psychic toll.... [T]he most common way
of dealing with the stigma [is] to remain secret and pass as a heterosex-
ual: to become part of the homosexual invisible minority." 93
88. Warren, Homosexuality and Stigma, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR, A MODERN REAP-
PRAisAL 123, 124 (J. Marmor ed. 1980).
89. Id. at 124.
90. See sources cited supra note 78.
91. Warren, supra note 88, at 125 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
92. See, eg., Neubring & Tyler, The Gay College Student: Perspectives for Mental Health Profes.
sionals, 4 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 64-72 (1974); see also J.S. DELoRA & C.A.B. WARREN,
UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL INTERACTION (1977); S. LYMAN & M. ScoTt, supra note 85; C.A.
TRiPP, supra note 78.
93. Warren, supra note 88, at 130.
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3. Stigma, Invisibility and Political Powerlessness. The existence of
an "invisible minority" presents a unique dilemma for Americans, both
gay and straight. Although Alfred Kinsey's work in 1948 demonstrated
that ten percent of the population, both men and women combined, is
predominantly homosexual in orientation,94 according to a recent Gallup
poll, only one in five Americans reported knowing a gay person.95 Kin-
sey's figure, with slight variations, holds across all social categories,
whether they be defined in terms of class, education, income, occupation,
political belief, region or religion.96 However, for most straight Ameri-
cans, ten percent is a statistic which does not seem to register any real
understanding or appreciation of the size of the group which is being
represented.
Today in the United States, given current census figures, there are
approximately 24 to 25 million gay Americans. This means that there
are as many gay people in the United States as there are Blacks, twice as
many as Hispanics, and three times as many as Jews. There are as many
gay men and lesbians in America as there are people in the entire state of
California; as there are people in the countries of Sweden, Denmark,
Austria and Ireland--combined.
97
As a stigmatized, invisible minority, lesbians and gay men are un-
able to fight for the right to be open about being gay, and effectively
lobby for legislation that would enhance their position in society, unless
gay people are already open about themselves; but gays cannot be reason-
ably open about themselves because lesbians and gay men do not have
the right to be openly gay.98
94. A.C. KINSEY, supra note 43, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN HUMAN MALES, at 650-51; SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN HUMAN FEMALES, at 472-75.
95. Public Fears - And Sympathies, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 12, 1985, at 23 (joint poll conducted by
Gallup and Newsweek).
96. A.C. KINSEY, supra note 94. See also Gonsiorek, Mental Healthk Introduction, in HoMo-
SEXUALITY 61 (W. Paul, J. Weinreich, J. Gonsiorek & M. Hotvedt eds. 1982).
97. Figures and comparisons as reported in M. KIRK & H. MADSEN, supra note 29, at 14-16.
98. See R.D. MOHR, supra note 23, at 186. For a discussion of anti-gay discrimination by gov-
ernment see Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the'Court System, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 497, 498 (1984); Heilman, The Constitutionality of Discharging Homosexual Military Per-
sonnel, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 191, 191-204 (1980-81); Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orienta-
tion Law in the Mid-Eighties (Parts I & II), 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 483-540 (1985); 11 U. Dayton L
Rev. 275-324 (1986); Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judger The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons
in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979); Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Prefer-
ence Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311, 317-19 (1980-81).
For discussion of anti-gay discrimination in the private sector see Huber, Report of the American
Sociological Association's Task Group on Homosexuality, 17 THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGIST 164
(1982); M. Levine & R. Leonard, Discrimination Against Lesbians in the Work Force, 9 SIGNS - J. oF
WOMEN IN CULTURE 700, 700-10 (E. Freedman ed. 1984); Levine, Employment Discrimination
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[A] person who is a member of an invisible minority and who must remain
invisible, hidden, and secreted in respect to her minority status as a condi-
tion for maintaining a livelihood is not free to be public about her minority
status or to incur suspicion by publicly associating with others who are
open about their similar status. And so she is effectively denied all political
power.... [S]he will be denied the freedom to express her views in a public
forum and to unite with or organize other like-minded individuals in an
attempt to compete for votes which would elect persons who will support
the policies advocated by her group. She is denied all effective use of legally
available means of influencing public opinion before voting and all effective
means of lobbying after elections are held. 99
The gay person in the United States, unless he or she is prepared to
risk the security of employment, housing, friends and family, is effec-
tively reduced to the status of a second class citizen. Unable to openly
and freely exercise basic democratic rights protected by the First Amend-
ment, including freedoms of speech, press, assembly and petition for the
redress of grievances, gay men and lesbians are excluded from the very
processes and institutions of democracy which control their lives. "The
eclipse of political access is most evident if we look at gays severally." 1"
[D]oes a gay person who has to laugh at and manufacture fag jokes in
workplace elevators and around workplace coffee urns, in order to deflect
suspicion from himself in an office which routinely fires gay employees,
have freedom to express his views on gay issues? Is it likely that such a
person could reasonably risk appearing in public at a gay rights rally?
Would such a person be able to participate in a march celebrating the
Stonewall Riots and the start of gay activism? Would such a person be able
to sign, let alone circulate, a petition protesting the firing of a gay worker?
Would such a person likely try to persuade workmates to vote for a gay-
positive city-councilman? Would such a person sign a letter to the editor
protesting abusive reportage of gay issues and events, or advocating the
discussion of gay issues in high schools?... [O]bviously not! Such a person
is transfixed by fear .... 1o1
Social intolerance, which has the effect of stigmatizing a whole class
Against Gay Men, 9 INT'L REV. OF MODERN SOC. 151 (1979); 127 CONG. REc. 23,300 (1981)(re-
marks of Sen. Tsongas)(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1981) (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH
TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY: FINAL REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS (J. Livingood ed.
1972) ("A study by the National Institute of Mental Health... showed that over 16 percent of all
gay people in this country have employment problems and over 9 percent lose their jobs solely
because of their sexual orientation.").
99. R.D. MOHR, supra note 23, at 173. For a discussion of the infringements on First Amend-
ment rights of gays see Gomez, The Public Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as Protected
Speech, 1 J. oF LAW AND INEQUALITY 121 (1983); Siegal, Lesbian and Gay Rights as a Free Speech
Issue: A Review of the Relevant Caselaw, 15 J. oF HOMOSEXUALITY (1988).
100. R.D. MOHR, supra note 23, at 170.
101. Id.
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of citizens in a democracy, is as corrosive, if not more so, than legal
enactments in undermining participatory and representative democracy.
John Stuart Mill singled out such nonlegal social forces for particular
criticism:
It is [social] stigma which is really effective [in stopping] the profession of
opinions which are under the ban of society.... In respect to all persons
but those whose pecuniary circumstances make them independent of the
good will of people, opinion is as efficacious as law; men might as well be
imprisoned as excluded from the means of earning their bread. Our merely
social intolerance roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them
or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion.
10 2
In the United States, society's moral stigma against gay sexuality
has pushed lesbians and gay men under the political process. Mohr notes
that having been "transfixed by fear," most gay people cannot even bring
themselves to write out a check in support of a gay rights organization
for fear that they will be discovered:
Some organizations, like National Gay Rights Advocates, desperately
aware of this . . . set up fund-raising account "fronts" with innocuous-
sounding names, like "Legal Foundation for Personal Liberties" in an at-
tempt to ease money, if not persons, out of the closet. Many organizations
simply dissimulate, lying by omission or vagueness in assuming for them-
selves closeted names; thus the national gay political action committee bap-
tizes itself "The Human Rights Campaign Fund." 103
Ultimately, because of their stigmatized and invisible status in
American society and politics, gay people as a minority are rendered es-
sentially powerless in bringing about the kinds of substantive changes
which democratic policies of participation and representation are in-
tended to afford. The Supreme Court has taken note of this phenomenon
as it has applied to other American minorities. In United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 4 the Supreme Court stated that, "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities."105 The concept of "dis-
crete and insular minorities" has been interpreted by the Court to refer to
groups which historically have been "subject to discrimination" and.
which exhibit "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that
102. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 30-31 (E. Rapaport ed. 1978).
103. RtD. Mohr, supra note 23, at 170 n.12.
104. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
105. aIL at 152 n.4.
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define them as a discrete group" who are "politically powerless."' 10 6
It is precisely because gay men and lesbians have, as a group, been
marginalized, if not totally excluded, from the political process that they
too should fall within the ambit of the Court's understanding of political
powerlessness. Religion, law and science have at various points in West-
ern history subjected lesbians and gay men to intense discrimination by
society. Moreover, as Marmor pointed out above, gay people do not
choose to be homosexual: it is an immutable component of their
psychosexual make-up.107 Taken together, discrimination and sexuality
106. See, eg., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1981) (exclusion from the political pro-
cess); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (history of discrimina-
tion); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685, 686 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (stereotypes
and "immutable" characteristics).
Under equal protection analysis, laws or regulations that employ suspect classifications-race,
national origin, and alienage-are strictly scrutinized. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Under strict scrutiny, the classification must be necessary to
achieve a compelling government interest. See, eg., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
Quasi-suspect classifications include gender and illegitimacy. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441, and
trigger intermediate scrutiny, which requires a substantial relationship between classification and an
important governmental interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Classifications that
are not suspect or quasi-suspect and do not implicate fundamental interests need only serve a legiti-
mate state interest and be reasonably related to the pursuit of such interest. See L. TRIBE, supra note
3, § 16-2, at 1440-41. See also infra notes 107 to 109 and accompanying text.
107. Scientific research has suggested that sexual orientation is largely immutable. See Coleman,
Changing Approaches to the Treatment of Homosexuality, in HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHO-
LOGICAL, AND B1OLOGICAL ISSUES 81-88 (W. Paul, J. Weinrich, 3. Gonsiorek & M. Hotvedt eds.
1982) (discussing the limited success of therapists' attempts to replace their patients' homosexual
activity with heterosexual activity and concluding that the "illness model of homosexuality is slowly
being put to rest").
Even a change in the gender of an individual's sexual partners will not usually produce a shift in
sexual orientation. In prisons, for example, non-gay male inmates frequently engage in homosexual
sex without adopting a same-sex sexual orientation. See W. WVOODEN & J. PARKER, MEN BEHIND
BARS: SEXUAL EXPLOrrATION IN PRISON 250 (1982) (reporting that 55.7% of heterosexual inmates
had engaged in homosexual acts while in prison).
Once an individual's sexual orientation is established in early life, it is difficult, if not impossible,
for him or her to alter it. Even if change is possible for some people, complete immutablility is not a
prerequisite to a finding that a classification is suspect. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (finding alienage-a mutable characteristic-a suspect classification); Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1074 n.52 (arguing that
"even if race or gender became readily mutable by biomedical means... laws burdening those who
choose to remain black or female would probably remain constitutionally suspect"). Rather than
focusing on whether it is possible for an individual to alter a particular characteristic, courts should
ask whether it would be offensive to condition legal protection on the requirement that one change a
highly personal, often self-defining, trait. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1347-
48 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Note, The Constitutional Status of
Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1304 (1985)
(arguing that, rather than basing the application of heightened scrutiny on the immutability of a
characteristic, courts should ask whether a characteristic is an aspect of personality fundamental to
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constitute gay men and lesbians as a discrete and insular group who,
because of their moral stigma, have been forced to remain an invisible
minority. Their invisibility, due to the stigma imposed, has rendered
them politically powerless as a group. 1°'
This being so, gays also should be accorded judicial solicitude in
reviewing legislation that has the effect of perpetuating the very forces
which keep them second class citizens: "(L]egislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation [should] be subjected to more exacting
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
than are most other types of legislation."' 9 Although the Supreme Court
has never extended this understanding to gay men and lesbians, other
courts have understood the unique political dilemma faced by gay
Americans.
individual identity). But cf Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 779-82 (1989)
(arguing that legal theories asserting that sexual orientation is a fundamental aspect of personal
identity only exacerbates society's erroneous assumption that gay men and lesbians are fundamen-
tally different from non-gay people).
108. For arguments in support of this position see, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local School
District, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT 162-
64 (1980); R.D. MOHR, supra note 23, at 169 n.10. See generally, Arriola, Sexual Identity and the
Constitution: Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 10 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP.
(Rutger's Univ.) 143, 156 (1988) (arguing that in the United States, the institutionalization of gender
values and heterosexuality causes the label "homosexual" to be placed on individuals as a mark of
difference).
109. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. Courts have usually declined to find that classifica-
tions based on sexual orientation deserve any form of heightened scrutiny. See, eg., Woodward v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); Padula v. Web-
ster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1599 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Childers v. Dallas Police Dept., 513 F. Supp. 134, 147 n.22 (N.D. Tex. 1981); but see
Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1347-48 (1988); benShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp.
1372, rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990) (E.D. Wis. 1989); High
Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. See. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1987) rev'd
895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990). In reaching this conclusion, some courts have simply relied on the
absence of a Supreme Court precedent holding that homosexuality is a suspect classification. See,
eg., Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 147 n.22. The Supreme Court, however, has never held that classifica-
tions based on sexual orientation are not suspect; it has simply never addressed the issue of suspect-
ness in the context of sexual orientation.
Courts which have simply rejected assertions that sexual orientation classifications should be ac-
corded heightened equal protection scrutiny have adopted a narrow view of the values that contem-
porary equal protection jurisprudence seeks to protect. The requirement of equal protection of the
laws implies that government may not "perennially reenforce the subordinate status of any group."
See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 16-21, at 1516. Government discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in state sodomy statutes violates this prohibition, and contravenes the principle that all
people have equal worth as human beings. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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In Gay Law Students Assoc v. PT&T Co.,11 O the California Supreme
Court declared that the firing of an openly gay employee violated the
plaintiff's political freedoms. Prior to the court's decision, Pacific Tele-
phone and Telegraph had an explicit company policy of firing its gay
employees. Although there were no systematic procedures, whenever the
company became aware of persons who were "manifestly gay," they were
immediately fired. The court held that such firings were in violation of
California's Labor Code,111 which forbids employers from preventing
employees from engaging or participating in politics. The court reasoned
that if gays are to have political rights, they must be free to be open about
who they are:
A principle barrier to homosexual equality is the common feeling that ho-
mosexuality is an affliction which the homosexual must conceal. Conse-
quently, one important aspect of the struggle for equal rights is to induce
homosexual individuals to "come out of the closet," acknowledge their sex-
ual preferences and to associate with others in working for equal rights. In
light of this factor in the movement for homosexual rights, the allegations
of the plaintiffs' complaint assumes a special significance.
1 12
The California Supreme Court, like the Supreme Court in Carolene
Products, understood that the private prejudices and biases perpetuated
in a stigma cannot be allowed to eclipse political rights. Rather, equal
rights and equal consideration form the normative moral baseline from
which legal and policy-making decisions must be drawn. Otherwise, so-
ciety's claim to be democratic becomes either incoherent or merely a de-
lusion of the majority. "[T]he equality of rights follows as a necessity,
for it is the defining property of morality.... The role of equality is that
of a base line: it determines that standard from which deviations must be
justified." '
B. Morality as a Legal Concept
State sodomy legislation perpetuates a religiously-based moral
stigma against gay Americans and effectively contributes to the curtail-
ment of any meaningful political participation for them in democratic
110. 24 Cal.3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal.Rptr. 14 (1979).
111. CAL. LAB. CODE, §§ 1101, 1102 (West 1971).
112. Gay Law Students Assoc., 24 Cal.3d at 488, 595 F.2d at 610-11, 156 Cal. Reptr. at 32-33.
For a study of the degree to which negative attitudes in the workplace toward gay employees are
overcome in proportion to the gay person's ability to be "out" see DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RE-
SOURCES, STATE OF OREGON, FINAL REPORT OF TnE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL PREFERENCE 73-
87 (1987).
113. M. SCRIVEN, supra note 73, at 258.
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processes. Because lesbians and gay men can be considered a discrete
and insular minority, such legislation should be accorded strict scrutiny
by the courts. For if equality is to be the baseline, any statute which
curtails equality must be justified morally in terms of an objective stan-
dard. If the rationalization for these statutes is the legislation of "moral-
ity," then "morality" must mean more than the enforcement of the
subjective biases and prejudices given force in a moral stigma. It must
mean the enforcement of objective normative morality: equality of rights
and "equal consideration in the formulation and application of the law of
the land and the actions of its government and people." '114
As the majority in Hardwick made clear, their understanding of
"morality," at least with respect to gays and sodomy statues, means sim-
ply "the majority sentiments about... morality." '115 This is extremely
problematical because of the extent to which it violates normative moral-
ity, establishes nonlegal social forces as the arbiter of political rights, and
subverts the democratic process. If the legislature and courts are going
to give legal force to this conception and, in effect, make it the official
state morality, serious questions regarding a violation of the First
Amendment's establishment clause must be addressed. This is so be-
cause of the very nature of the assumptions underlying "majority senti-
ments about morality" as it applies to the issue of gay sexuality. For as
Marmor pointed out above, "The legal, moral and stigmatizing aspects of
the issue of homosexuality are so closely intertwined [that t]he laws of a
society, in matters such as these, are simply encoded reflections of reli-
gious teachings." '116
114. Id. at 242.
115. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.




The laws of God, the laws of man,
He may keep that will and can;
Not P" let God and man decree
Laws for themselves and not for me;
And if my ways are not as theirs
Let them mind their own affairs.
Their deeds I judge and much condemn,
Yet when did I make laws for them?
Please yourselves, say I, and they
Need only look the other way.
But no, they will not; they must still
Wrest their neighbor to their will,
And make me dance as they desire
With jail and gallows and hell-fire.
And how am I to face the odds
Of man's bedevilment and God's?117
A. Private Acts or Public Consequences?
Because sodomy legislation has the public consequence of perpetuat-
ing the moral stigmatization of gay people and the eclipse of their polit-
ical participation in democratic processes, an appropriate evaluation of
such statutes is not primarily the degree to which they intrude on pri-
vacy, but the extent to which they violate the First Amendment's prohi-
bition against government-sponsored religion. For unless it can be
demonstrate that traditional Judeo-Christian assessments of gay sexual-
ity are defensible under a standard of normative morality, it is clear that
"morality" as understood by the majority in Hardwick is, as Marmor
observes, "simply encoded reflections of religious teachings."11 Thus,
the democratic public policy issue becomes not one of whether or not
government may legitimately legislate morality, but the extent to which
government may enforce religiously-based descriptive conceptions of mo-
rality without violating the establishment clause of the First
Amendment.
The federal Constitution's establishment clause reads in pertinent
part that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
117. Housman, The laws of God, the laws of man, reprinted in THE PENGUIN BOOK op HOMO-
SEXUAL VERSE, at 238-39 (1983).
118. Marmor, supra note 66.
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religion ... ,,19 Although on its face the clause is directed toward Con-
gress, like the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, it has been held to be
applicable to the states through incorporation under the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause. 20 In order for legislation to satisfy
the establishment clause's prohibition against government-sponsored reli-
gion, the Court has traditionally applied a three-pronged test to deter-
mine whether or not a government action violates the clause. These
three prongs were first enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.'2'
B. Lemon v. Kurtzman
Under the Lemon test, a statute must satisfy each of the following
conditions in order for it withstand establishment clause scrutiny:
(1) The statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) the statute's
principle or primary effect must neither inhibit nor advance religion; and
(3) the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion. 12 2 Although the Lemon test has been increasingly attacked
in recent years as inadequate in evaluating questions of the proper rela-
tionship between government and religion,121 it nevertheless remains
both the intial and penultimate analysis for establishment clause jurispru-
dence. Moreover, as discussed below, the opinions of Justice O'Connor,
which have been adopted by the Court's current majority in establish-
ment clause cases, 24 are shaping the rationale of the doctrine in a man-
ner which proves to be of significant benefit in clarifying the right of gay
Americans to be free from a religiously-based moral stigma.
1. The Requirement of Secular Purpose. The requirement of secu-
lar purpose has been interpreted to mean that whenever a government
action is perceived to "endorse or disapprove of religion, ' 1 25 a violation
of the establishment clause has taken place. Justice O'Connor has pro-
vided an understanding of establishment principles which proves to be
extremely useful in applying the Lemon test. In her concurring opinion
119. U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
120. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), reh'g denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947).
121. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
122. Id at 612-13.
123. See, eg., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 33, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124. See County of Allegheney v. A.C.L.U., 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3104-05 (1989) (Blackmun, J.)
(adopting for the majority opinion the analysis and rationale of Justice O'Connor's concurring opin-
ion in Lynch v. Donnelly and Wallace v. Jaffree).
125. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690
(1984)) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1990]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
in Wallace v. Jaffree,126 Justice O'Connor states that: "[t]he relevant is-
sue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state
endorsement .. ."127
A hypothetical "objective observer" would perceive that sodomy
statutes, given their "text, legislative history, and implementation" are an
endorsement of religion; for as Marmor has pointed out, these laws are
"simply encoded reflections of... religious teachings." Although the
Court in Hardwick attempted to justify Georgia's sodomy legislation as
promoting a legitimate secular state interest in legislating "morality,"
they defined morality as the "majority sentiments about... morality."12
Those "majority sentiments" are indisputably manifestations of the
West's religiously-based moral system. It follows that the extent to
which the Court purposefully enforces those "sentiments" over norma-
tive standards of morality is the extent to which the government has pur-
posefully endorsed sectarian religious doctrines about morality over
secular democratic values expressed as the morality of equal rights and
equal consideration.
As I have argued above, the only coherently defensible conception
of morality is one which is both normative and secular, objective as to
principles and independent as to standards. Without a morality which is
both objective and independent, it runs the risk of becoming merely a
vehicle of majoritarian prejudice. If morality as a legally enforceable and
secular concept is to have any consistency and legitimacy in democratic
policy-making, it must mean equal rights.
'Equal rights' means fundamentally or ultimately equal consideration, not
equal consideration on specific issues in which there are good reasons for all
to adopt a procedure that takes greater account in the immediate case of
some persons' views than others.... The question is always whether the
reasons for according unequal consideration on a particular occasion are
derived from principles which accord equal benefits .... 12 9
The benefits accorded in Hardwick were clearly allotted unequally
to the adherents of religiously-based descriptive morality at the expense
of equal consideration for the political rights of gay men and lesbians to
be free from a socially-approved and legally enforced moral stigma.
Thus, the Court's decision served to benefit by approval a religiously-
126. Id.
127. Id at 76.
128. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
129. M. SCRIVEN, supra note 73, at 241 (emphasis in original).
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based animus against gays while undermining secular legislation by al-
lowing its conformance with religious doctrine to take precedence over
the enforcement of a normative morality appropriate and necessary for a
coherent democratic society.
As the Court itself noted in striking down an Arkansas public
school curriculum anti-evolution law in Epperson v. Arkansas,' when
there is no "suggestion... the.., law [is] justified by considerations of
state policy other than [a desire to support] the religious views of some of
its citizens,"'' the law violates the establishment clause. Similarly, in
Edwards v. Aguillard,132 Justice O'Connor wrote that if "it is beyond
purview that endorsement of religion or a religious belief, 'was and is the
law's reason for existence' "'I" the law must be struck down.
Although the Judeo-Christian tradition may be considered moral,
morality is not the Judeo-Christian tradition. The fact that the Court, in
the name of morality, failed to even make an attempt at formulating a
non-religiously-based moral standard, but preferred rather to uphold "a
particular religious doctrine... with a particular interpretation... by a
particular religious group"' 34 as to what is moral, demonstrates that, in
the absence of any secular policy justifications to the contrary which ac-
cord with the application of a normative morality, the Court's upholding
sodomy legislation was to simply endorse religious views about morality
and thus violate the first prong of Lemon.
2. The Requirement of Secular Effect If it is arguable that sod-
omy legislation may, in fact, have a secular purpose, it is difficult to argue
that it does not have the primary effect of advancing religion. In analyz-
ing the effect prong of the Lemon test, the insights of Justice O'Connor
are again useful. In Lynch v. Donnelly,'35 Justice O'Connor, in her con-
curring opinion, wrote that the effects test may be considered within the
framework of an endorsement analysis where "[e]ndorsement sends a
message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community."'
36
Sodomy statutes have as their principle effect a perception in society
130. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
131. Id. at 107.
132. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
133. Id. at 2575 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 108).
134. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103.
135. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 688.
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that government officially approves of certain religious doctrines con-
cerning the immorality of gay sexuality. Consequently, through the leg-
islation of such laws, the government is seen as advancing the moral
standards of the adherents of those religious doctrines over and against
the claims of non-adherents to a secular morality of equal rights and
equal consideration.
An "objective observer" would thus infer that government has made
the determination that religious adherents are "more moral" than non-
adherents, and that so they must be better citizens than non-adherents.
Thus, the government sends "a message to non-adherents that they are
outsiders.., and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community." This perception
has as its logical terminus an evaluation that the political views of adher-
ents are to be favored over those of non-adherents in the formulation of
law and policy, because non-adherents are immoral and can neither be
good citizens nor "full members of the political community."
An even more alarming effect is the degree to which being outside
the political community compounds the moral stigma in legitimizing vio-
lence against gay people. "Queer-bashing" is justified in the minds of its
perpetrators because of the socially-imposed stigma and perception that
lesbians and gay men are immoral, criminal and sick.' 37 Sodomy legisla-
tion has the effect of reinforcing and perpetuating this stigmatization of
gay people and, consequently, the prejudices and hatred of homophobes
and queer-bashers.
In Palmore v. Sidoti,'38 the Supreme Court held that such "[p]rivate
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect." '139 However, this is exactly, in fact, what
sodomy legislation does. Anti-gay violence is the indirect effect of the
state's direct effect in stigmatizing gay men and lesbians as immoral
137. For an analysis of the complex dynamics of violence perpetrated against gay men and
lesbians in contemporary American society see BASHERS, BArrERs AND BIGOTS (J. DeCecco ed.
1985); NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN VICTIMIZATION (1984).
See also SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COMMITIEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REP-
RESENTATIVES, 99TH CONG., 2ND SEss., ANTI-GAY VIOLENCE, (serial no. 132 1986).
For a discussion of gay self-hatred resulting from internalized societal homophobia see B. AD-
Am, THE SURVIVAL OF DOMINATION: INFERIORIZATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1978) (chapter 4);
A. HODGES & D. HUTrER, WITH DOWNCAST GAYS: ASPECTS OF HOMOSEXUAL SELF-OPPRESSION
(1979); Rist, On Hating Ourselves, in GAY LIFE (E.E. Rolls ed. 1986). For an analysis of the role of
internalized homophobia in gay suicides see I THOUGHT PEOPLE LIKE THAT KILLED THEM-
SELVES: LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND SUICIDE (E.E. Rols ed. 1983).
138. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
139. Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 38
SIN, STIGMA & SOCIETY
political outsiders. The Supreme Court in Palmore sent an unambiguous
message to government-the perpetuation of stigma in law is not legiti-
mate: "The question.. is whether the reality of private biases and the
possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations.... We
have little difficulty concluding they are not.
' 14°
Sodomy statutes perpetuate and advance religious biases against gay
citizens and serve to create a political division in society between moral
"insiders" and immoral "outsiders;" visible members of the "political
community" and invisible, politically powerless second class citizens.
This political division, drawn along a religiously-formulated test of moral
citizenship, is exactly the type of scenario which Justice O'Connor con-
demns as a violation of the second prong of Lemon. Sodomy statutes
must fail the effects test on two accounts: they perpetuate and advance a
religiously-based stigma and they create political division by establishing
religiously-based criteria by which citizens are adjudged as either moral
or immoral.
3. The Requirement of No Excessive Government Entanglement.
The requirement of no excessive government entanglement is a test
which reflects the Court's traditional concern that government and
church must not interfere with the operation of each other's sphere of
influence.141 Thus, there is an attempt to limit possible conflicts which
may tend to compromise either the political system or the autonomy of
religion. 142 When either government or religion become so entangled, the
third prong of Lemon is violated, and the government action must be
struck down as an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
As the dissent in Hardwick pointed out with respect to the morality
of gay sexuality, "certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn
the behavior at issue.., the state [has] no license to impose their judg-
ment on the entire citizenry."14 The Judeo-Christian tradition, as well as
society at large, holds a wide range of religious, as well as non-religious,
opinions concerning the morality of homosexuality. 1" This fact, how-
140. Id.
141. See Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) ("T]he
First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to
achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.").
142. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985) (church-state entanglement might compro-
mise liberty of conscience); Waltz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in result) (church-state entanglement might strain the political system); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421,431 (1962) (church-state entanglement might "destroy government and degrade religion").
143. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144. See, ag., HoMosxuAu.rry AND ETncs (E. Batchelor ed. 1980) (reflecting the wide theo-
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ever, was simply ignored by the Hardwick majority. Instead, the Court
purposefully chose one particular religious doctrine over other equally
possible religious doctrines or nonreligious standards.
In making such a policy choice, the Court allowed the government
to lend its persuasive influence and coercive power in an advantageous
way to the religious doctrines of a particular religious group while con-
currently working a disadvantage to those religious groups who's doc-
trines were not adopted by the state. Government thereby entered into a
doctrinal debate appropriate only to the religious sphere and violated the
conviction of the Court that religion must succeed or fail "according to
the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma." '145
Similarly, in the political sphere, the Court allowed a religious doc-
trine to be elevated to the level of a legal sine qua non of morality, even
though it has long held that "only in a theocratic state... [may] ecclesi-
astical doctrines measure legal right or wrong." 146 The Court thereby
permitted religion to compromise the political system by compelling the
debate on gay sexuality to be conducted within the parameters of a relig-
iously-based conception of what is morally right or wrong.
By allowing government to legislate sodomy statutes, the Court has
permitted church and state to operate illegitimately within each other's
legitimate sphere of influence. Compromises of both the political system
and the autonomy of religion are the result because of the degree to
which the prohibitions against sodomy have one foot in religion and the
other in government. Thus, entanglement is inevitable because of the
religiously-based "moral" nature of the secular "crime" of sodomy.
Such statutes violate the third prong of Lemon and should be struck
down as an unconstitutional establishment of government-sponsored
religion.
C. Conclusions
Under any or all of the prongs of Lemon, sodomy laws could be
struck down. Yet, even failing Lemon, under a Carolene strict scrutiny
analysis, they should be declared unconstitutional because of the degree
to which they perpetuate a socially-imposed and politically debilitating
moral stigma for gays, whose status as a discrete and insular minority
logical divergence in views concerning the morality of homosexuality, from "intrinsically unnatural
and evil" to "intrinsically natural and good").
145. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
146. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 654 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
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warrant such judicial solicitude. This is especially so when, in consider-
ing all of the evils which are perpetrated through sodomy laws, perhaps
the most offensive is the assault on dignity which they represent for gay
Americans:
Sodomy laws not only cause unwarranted harms... but more importantly
are assaults on dignity. Unenforced sodomy laws are invective by govern-
ment. They violate a person's essential desert for equal respect because
they represent a failure of the members of the majority to hold the desires,
plans and aspirations of gay people on a par with their own. Further, as
aspersions, like racial, religious, or gender slurs, appealing to widely irrele-
vant characteristics, unenforced sodomy laws fail to respect gays as moral
agents, for they judge gays without regard to their individual merits or
accomplishments. 47
In the end, morality should not be simply a set of rules for enforcing
the way people think life ought to be lived, but a reflection of the way
people find life is. If society will "not recognize that morality has no
foundation or justification except as a solution to the problems of social
living,"' 48 then morality will be reduced to either a myth or the sheer
exercise of power to maintain and exploit unjust disparities of treatment
between citizens. "Recourse to rational ethics is the only alternative to
power struggles, victories and reprisals .... [R]ational ethics means the
recognition of equality of rights."' 4 9
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147. R.D. Mohr, supra note 23, at 123-24.
148. M. ScIVEN, supra note 73, at 286.
149. Id. at 257.
* I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Stephanie Phillips for her insight, critique
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